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INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of 
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the mod-
ern state.1 
 ~Adolf A. Berle 
Consider the following three scenarios: 
(1)  The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Af-
rica, a coalition of the local subsidiaries of a number of major mul-
tinational pharmaceutical corporations, challenges the South Afri-
can government’s legislative efforts to increase access to medicines.  
In a lawsuit filed in the South African High Court, the corporations 
argue that the proposed reforms would constitute a violation of their 
property rights.2  South Africans living with HIV and AIDS oppose 
the industry lawsuit asserting that corporations place at risk their 
rights to health, dignity, and life.3  Street protests against “profiteer-
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ing pharmaceutical empires” start in South Africa and gain solidar-
ity supporters around the world.4  The corporate coalition elects to 
drop the lawsuit after losing in the court of international public 
opinion.  The conflict comes to be understood as a contest between 
the “private interest of the pharmaceutical industry” and “people’s 
lives and the public interest.”5 
(2)  Nigerian environmental activists allege that activities of a cor-
poration engaged in oil exploration and extraction are damaging 
ecological systems and disrupting traditional ways of life.  While 
activists engage in acts of civil disobedience and destroy equipment, 
the corporation’s executives demand protection for the industry’s 
investments and operations in the area.  The Nigerian military gov-
ernment uses violent force to protect property.  Eventually, the con-
flict escalates ending in the execution of a prominent community 
activist.6  Litigation later brought in a United States Federal District 
Court alleges corporate complicity in the human rights violations 
visited upon environmental activists by the government.7 
(3)  A pro-democracy activist in China is arrested and imprisoned. 
An electronic correspondence, which he assumed was transmitted in 
confidence to a U.S. based human rights organization, was inter-
cepted by the Chinese state security apparatus, surrendered by an 
Internet media and communications corporation.8  Chinese state se-
curity forces in turn identify the activist based on information pro-
vided by the corporation.9  The activist remains imprisoned and the 
corporation involved is widely criticized for its complicity with the 
Chinese government in violating the activist’s human rights.10 
In each of these instances, what does responsible corporate conduct 
require?  What is evil? What are the corporation’s obligations and to 
whom does the corporation owe these obligations?  What options are 
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available to multinational enterprise, and which options should be exer-
cised when confronted with these or similar situations? 
Much corporate legal scholarship considers such fact patterns as 
beyond the scope of the discipline’s core concerns.  Yet, increasingly, 
questions are asked concerning the scale and scope of modern corporate 
power.  This Article will challenge the conventional understanding of 
what the core discipline of corporate law should encompass and argues 
that the failure to focus on precisely these sorts of factual scenarios in-
volving allegations of corporate complicity in human rights violations 
and environmental degradation is misguided and short-sighted. 
This Article situates Adolf A. Berle’s contribution to the field of 
corporate law in the context of current debates over the alleged complic-
ity of multinational corporations in international human rights violations.  
Specifically, this Article revisits some central insights offered by Berle 
and Gardiner C. Means in The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty and reconsiders what conducting business consciously across bor-
ders requires in the context of a governance gap generated by economic 
globalization.  Further, this Article considers how both ownership and 
control are well situated to ensure that business conduct becomes better 
aligned with a growing consciousness that business organizations must 
respect human rights and protect the environment, or risk reputational 
harm.  This Article concludes by asserting that the dominant approach to 
the study of corporate law, with its emphasis on internal governance and 
the relationship between ownership and control, must be dislodged to 
create space for additional inquiry focusing on the external effects of the 
modern corporation and its relationship to society. 
By revisiting some of the insights offered by Berle, this Article re-
views how his insights might inform international human rights advo-
cacy and corporate social responsibility in cross–border contexts.  This 
Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes how Berle’s groundbreak-
ing work, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, was received 
at the time of its publication, and its treatment over time.  In addition, 
Part I also reviews the relevant portions of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property that could serve to further advance the consciousness 
underlying contemporary efforts to demand corporate accountability for 
human rights violations.  Part II documents how human rights advocates 
have criticized corporate conduct and increasingly asserted claims 
against corporations for alleged complicity in human rights violations 
and environmental damage over the past several years.  Finally, Part III 
offers reflections on how legal scholars might look to Berle’s legacy to 
explain the underlying conditions that can lead to human rights violations 
where corporate power operates in various governance voids around the 
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globe.  Part III concludes that, under pressure from the “community,” 
ownership and control can and must consider external effects in order to 
make choices that are sustainable for the environment and consistent 
with human dignity. 
I.  THE MODERN CORPORATION AND BERLE’S CONTRIBUTION TO 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Over the course of his professional life, Adolf Berle earned acclaim 
for a wide variety of achievements.  Berle was a successful corporate 
lawyer, a respected legal scholar, and an early academic prodigy entering 
Harvard College at age fourteen.11  Eventually, Berle went on to become 
an advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the “Brain Trust” that 
masterminded the New Deal’s regulatory reforms.12  Later in life, Berle 
was a diplomat and, while serving as Assistant Secretary of State, a lead-
ing authority on Latin-American affairs.13  In the interim, Berle intro-
duced crucially important ideas concerning the nature of concentrated 
private power—in the form of the modern corporation—and its conse-
quences for the public. 
After his death, in addition to his service to presidents of both par-
ties since Woodrow Wilson, Berle was remembered for his committed 
public service, from his position on the delegation staff at the Versailles 
Peace Conference after World War I, to his efforts to establish the nas-
cent United Nations.14  In academic circles, Berle is remembered for his 
contribution to corporate legal scholarship.  Awarded an interdisciplinary 
grant from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation in 1927, at the 
recommendation of Edwin Gay, an economic historian and the founding 
Dean of the Harvard Business School, Berle, in cooperation with Colum-
bia University economist Gardiner E. Means, undertook a comprehensive 
study of the corporation combining the perspectives of their respective 
disciplines.15  Published in 1932, the resulting text, The Modern Corpo-
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ration and Private Property, received critical acclaim, as well as a con-
siderable amount of criticism. 
Fundamentally, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
presented a challenge to the traditional logic of property and profits by 
pointing out two powerful phenomena: the concentration of power and 
the separation of ownership from control over the corporation.  After 
exploring the inadequacies of traditional theory to explain and address 
the potential consequences of increasingly concentrated commercial 
power, The Modern Corporation and Private Property advanced a new 
concept of the corporation, and called for a reorientation of enterprise.16 
A.  Commentary on Berle’s Modern Corporation 
At the time of its publication, lawyer Jerome Frank, who would 
later be appointed to chair the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
equated The Modern Corporation to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.17  
Historian Charles Beard likened the book to The Federalist.18  Commen-
tators and the popular print media celebrated the book. The book was 
described as “epoch-making” in The Nation.19  A review in The New Re-
public praised the book as “epoch-shattering.”20  Indeed, the original 
publisher, Commerce Clearing House, fearing reprisals from its over-
whelmingly corporate clientele, declined to print the book because of its 
“critical implications.”21 
Business historian Thomas K. McCraw attributed the success of 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property to its “extended analyti-
cal form” and “ingenious mixture of statistics” combining both “highly 
technical legal argument, and philosophical speculation.”22  According to 
McCraw, The Modern Corporation and Private Property was written in 
a rhetorical style which makes it possible to read as “either as a dispas-
sionate analysis—an exercise in value-neutral social science—or as a 
manifesto.”23  Arguably, over the years different audiences have read the 
book to suit their own preferences and perspectives. 
Over time, The Modern Corporation and Private Property was 
criticized by neoclassical quarters.  A 1982 symposium hosted by Stan-
ford’s Hoover Institution to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property’s publication produced a 
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number of articles condemning several aspects of the book.  For exam-
ple, Robert Hessen argued that Berle and Means’ claims concerning the 
risks associated with shareholders’ surrendering to control “defied com-
mon sense.”24  George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland attributed The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property’s apparently unmerited influ-
ence to the “astonishingly uncritical” reception it received from “lawyers 
(and other amateurs),” despite the book’s “inconclusiveness,” and the 
fact that “the actual effects of the separation of ownership and control are 
left undetermined, and even understudied” in the book.25  Nathan Rosen-
berg credited Berle and Means with identifying “some profound social 
transformations,” albeit with “a peculiar tunnel vision.”26 
Reactions to the book, as well as assessments of its role and influ-
ence on the body of corporate law, vary.  For instance, writing years 
later, contemporary progressive corporate legal scholar Dalia Tsuk 
placed part of the responsibility for “the exclusion of workers’ interests 
from corporate law and shareholder centrism” not solely with Milton 
Friedman.  Tsuk also emphasized the general reluctance of “American 
legal scholars (progressives, moderates and conservatives),”—Berle in-
cluded—“to accept the existence of a permanent, working, wage-labor 
class.”  Tsuk argues that the omission of other interests to the exclusion 
of the shareholder resulted in a failure to consider class and power differ-
entials.27 
Basically, Berle is celebrated, criticized, often cited, and, more of-
ten, misunderstood.  According to Tsuk, amidst the shifting tides of cor-
porate theory, worse perhaps than being “misinterpreted,” The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property has been “functionally rewritten.”28  
Tsuk argues that subsequent scholars have distorted the book’s discus-
sion of the separation of ownership from control to justify a shareholder-
centered vision of managerial obligations to the exclusion of other inter-
ests.29 Indeed, important aspects of Berle’s work that could have ex-
panded the core concerns of the study of corporate law have fallen out of 
favor. 
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Nevertheless, The Modern Corporation and Private Property re-
mains relevant and one of the most cited works in legal scholarship.30  
According to William W. Bratton, Berle’s scholarship survives because 
he “diagnosed a persistent condition . . . problems left untreated both 
then and now.”31  McCraw attributes The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property’s lasting influence to the profound questions it raised: 
Many thousands of nonfiction books appear annually in the United 
States. Most encounter a cosmic apathy.  Some become standard 
references and are consulted by specialists for years afterward.  A 
tiny handful—two or three per decade—raise penetrating and per-
sistent questions in some memorable way.  They become classics, to 
be cited, if not necessarily read, for generations into the future.  The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property is such a classic. . . . It 
etched two powerful ideas—industrial concentration and the separa-
tion of ownership and control—into the thoughts of a broad body of 
intellectuals, and thereby gained a permanent place in the life of the 
mind.32 
In the academic imagination, Berle’s The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property is remembered primarily for the attention it drew to the 
economic risks associated with the separation between ownership and 
control in large publicly traded companies.  Equally important, however, 
was its observations about the concentration of power within large pub-
licly traded corporations.  More significant, for informing contemporary 
conversations about the social responsibility of business, was the book’s 
call for consideration of the interests of the community by powerful cor-
porate actors. 
B.  Berle’s Contribution to Modern Corporate Law 
Exploration of the economic risks that could accompany the separa-
tion of ownership from control, as was increasingly characteristic of 
larger corporations at the time Berle wrote, remains, perhaps, the most 
well known aspect of The Modern Corporation and Private Property.33  
However, the text’s more significant contribution was its central observa-
tion that the corporate form was in the process of a revolutionary transi-
tion; a transition that could provide the corporate form with the power 
and potential to transform society.  In Berle’s view, “[t]he corporate form 
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had acquired a larger significance.”34 He saw that the corporation was 
“becoming both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing 
economic life.”35 
Hence, for Berle, it was no longer accurate to regard corporations as 
“merely legal devices” for the facilitation of private business transactions 
between individuals.36 More accurately, certain developments had given 
rise to a “corporate system.”37  Predicting a “spectacular rise” for the 
corporate form, Berle envisioned a corporate system that would rival the 
feudal system in its capacity to influence social relations.38  Based on his 
analysis of economic data, “every indication seems to be that the system 
will move forward to proportions which would stagger imagination.”39 
Berle attributed the corporation’s new power to two developments: 
the industrial factory system and the system of finance.  The industrial 
factory system brought the labor of a large numbers of workers under a 
single managerial control.  Therefore, the large corporation could enjoy 
access to scale manufacturing and concentrated power over labor.  Si-
multaneously, financial access to the public capital markets permitted a 
large number of investors to place their wealth under the same central 
control. 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property made clear that an 
emerging new aspect of the corporation was its control over significant 
sums of wealth: “the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of in-
numerable individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and 
whereby control over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direc-
tion.”40  What remained less clear was the nature of the new relationship 
between capital and control, and the societal consequences of these new 
relationships. 
Berle discerned different relationships between the functions inher-
ent in enterprise structure as follows: 
In discussing problems of enterprise it is possible to distinguish be-
tween three functions: that of having interests in an enterprise, that 
of having power over it, and that of acting with respect to it. . . .  
Under the corporate system, the second function that of having 
power over an enterprise, has become separated from the first.  The 
position of the owner has been reduced to that of having a set of le-
gal and factual interests in the enterprise while the group which we 
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have called control, are in the position of having legal and factual 
powers over it.41 
Without legal and factual powers over the enterprise, how would 
property owners ensure the responsible management and exercise of cor-
porate resources?  For Berle, “The property owner who invests in a mod-
ern corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the 
corporation that he has exchanged the position of an independent owner 
for one in which he may become merely recipient of the wages of capi-
tal.”42 
As a result of the changing trend in corporate financing, The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property explained that the private corpora-
tion was giving way to a “quasi public” corporation.  Indeed, “the quasi-
public corporation commands its supply of capital from a group of inves-
tors frequently described as the ‘investing public’.”43 
In an instructive passage, Berle claims that: 
By the use of the open market for securities . . . corporations assume 
obligations toward the investing public which transform it from a 
legal method clothing the rule of a few individuals into an institu-
tion at least nominally serving investors who have embarked their 
funds in its enterprise.  New responsibilities towards owners, the 
workers, the consumers, and the State thus rest upon the shoulders 
of those in control.  In creating these new relationships, the quasi-
public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution.44 
This revolutionary emerging “quasi public” corporate entity is 
characterized by proliferation in the number of owners and a significant 
amount of separation between the ownership of the corporation and those 
in control.  In a key move, Berle argues: “it is precisely this separation of 
control from ownership which makes possible tremendous aggregations 
of property.”45  Accordingly, the revolution rested in determining the 
nature of the responsibilities of control, and its relationship with inves-
tors, employees, consumers, society, and the state. 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle portrayed 
these developments as a revolutionary departure from the past practices 
of industry.  Rather than being limited by size and controlled by indi-
viduals with close relationships to the capital, the modern business orga-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 41. Id. at 119–20; McCraw, supra note 15, at 585 (arguing that “the control” for Berle and 
Means represents “the de facto locus of power, and specifically the power to name the board of 
directors”). 
 42. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 3. 
 43. Id. at 5. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
974 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
nization involved: “aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of 
thousands of workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, 
belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are com-
bined through the corporate mechanism into a single producing organiza-
tion under unified control and management.”46 
The modern corporation was supplanting a system where investors 
held more of a vested interest in their enterprise because they were more 
closely connected to their capital.  Earlier business organizations typi-
cally were owned by individuals or small groups of individuals, and 
managed personally or by agents.  These early businesses were under 
direct control because the interests of the individual and the interests of 
the business aligned.47  Absent this alignment, Berle feared the risk of 
divergent interests emerging, potentially to the detriment of owners. 
For Berle, the modern corporation was revolutionary because it 
served to destroy the previously existing assumptions associated with the 
unity of property through dividing ownership. Such destruction could 
relocate the seat of power in enterprise.  Accordingly, this revolutionary 
development raised important questions for the future of the corporate 
form, as Berle explained: 
The explosion of the atom of property destroys the basis of the old 
assumption that the quest for profits will spur the owner of indus-
trial property to its effective use.  It consequently challenges the 
fundamental economic principle of individual initiative in industrial 
enterprise. It raises for reexamination the question of the motive 
force back of industry and the ends for which the modern corpora-
tion will be run.48 
As a normative matter, Berle was concerned that management’s 
motives might diverge from owner’s interests.  Where previously man-
agement and ownership were often one and the same, in the emerging 
corporate form, owners were many and diffuse.  Hence, for Berle “own-
ership continually becomes more dispersed; the power formerly joined to 
it becomes increasingly concentrated; and the corporate system is 
thereby more securely established.”49  Berle was deeply concerned with 
the consequences of the establishment of the type of corporate system his 
analysis predicted. 
The motivations constraining management and counseling the re-
sponsible exercise of power were being removed, as the distance be-
tween control of operations in the enterprise and the owners of the enter-
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prise increased.  Where control and ownership were separate, Berle iden-
tified the risk that control would not serve the interests of the owners, but 
rather its own; becoming self-interested and self-serving.  Berle ques-
tioned the relationship resulting from “owners without appreciable con-
trol and the control without appreciable ownership.”50  Whether control 
would fulfill its obligations to ownership would depend on the degree to 
which “the self interest of those in control may run parallel to the inter-
ests of ownership,” and where those interests might differ, checks on 
power could come from political, economic, or social demands.51 
After portraying the developments that placed the modern corpora-
tion in a potentially revolutionary position, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property questioned the consequences of concentrated power and 
considered possibilities for restraining power.  Berle equated the aggre-
gations of power in the enterprise system with the rise of empire: “an 
economic empire—an empire bounded by no geographical limits, but 
held together by centralized control.”52  Berle expected the rise of 
“princes of industry,” who would lead the empire of new enterprise and 
eventually come to occupy positions in society that were yet to be de-
fined. 53 
In a revealing passage, Berle observed: 
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of 
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the mod-
ern state—economic power versus political power, each strong in its 
own field.  The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corpora-
tion, while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, 
makes every effort to avoid such regulation.  Where its own inter-
ests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state.  The fu-
ture may see the economic organism now typified by the corpora-
tion, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly even su-
perseding it as the dominant form of social organization.  The law 
of corporations, accordingly, might well be considered as a potential 
constitutional law for the new economic state, while business prac-
tice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesman-
ship.54 
After exposing the potential risks of concentrated power and the po-
tential to compete with the state, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property advocated a new approach to conceptualizing the corporate 
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form.  The text advanced an alternative and “wholly new concept of cor-
porate activity,” where “neither the claims of ownership nor those of 
control can stand against the paramount interests of the community.”55  
In light of the circumstances, Berle recognized that this new conceptuali-
zation was needed in order to protect the interests of society and to en-
sure the responsible exercise of corporate power.56 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property rejected two ways 
of ensuring the responsible exercise of power and advanced a new alter-
native.  The first option would be to apply strict property rules to passive 
ownership and to exercise power for the benefit of security owners.  But 
Berle feared this would result in “the bulk of American industry operated 
by trustees for the sole benefit of inactive and irresponsible security 
owners.”57  Accordingly, Berle rejected the traditional claim that a corpo-
ration belongs to its shareholders and “theirs is the only interest to be 
recognized as the object of corporate activity.”58 
The second option would be to treat the corporation under princi-
ples of contract.  But Berle also rejected this option, because this could 
leave “a set of uncurbed powers in the hands of control.”59  To Berle, 
treating security holders as if they had agreed in advance to any losses 
they might suffer opened the risk of “corporate oligarchy with plunder-
ing.”60 
Finally, The Modern Corporation and Private Property advanced a 
new alternative, settling on an understanding of the corporate enterprise 
as one in which “shareholders by surrendering control and responsibility 
over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation 
should be operated in their sole interest.”61  This new alternative allowed 
the corporate enterprise to operate for shareholders, while also taking 
larger societal conditions into account. 
Berle identified the problem of the concentration of power and the 
divergence of interest.  Put another way, Berle pointed out an increasing 
aggregation of power coupled with the disaggregation of many poten-
tially conflicting interests.  He identified inadequacies in traditional theo-
ries offering an account of the corporation.  Berle argued that the tradi-
tional logic of property and profits no longer fit the emerging corporate 
form.  As a result, Berle offered a new concept of the corporation, plac-
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ing “the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation 
serve not alone the owners or the control but all society.”62 
C.  The Meaning of Berle’s Modern Corporation for Contemporary 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Given the increasing power of the corporate system, Berle believed 
a new and greater responsibility towards a broader segment of society 
was necessary. To Berle, control did not automatically accrue more 
power simply because passive owners had surrendered and ceded author-
ity to control.  For Berle, the “community” at large now held interest in 
the actions of the enterprise.  The shareholder’s surrender of control 
“cleared the way for the claims of a group far wider than either the own-
ers or the control group; it had placed the community in a position to 
demand that the modern corporation serve not only the owners or the 
control group, but all society.”63  Significant to the contemporary conver-
sation concerning corporate social responsibility, Berle argued that the 
community could appropriately make demands of industry and that in-
dustry should serve society. 
An increasingly vocal opposition to corporate conduct that impedes 
the enjoyment of rights and negatively impacts the environment currently 
characterizes conversations on corporate social responsibility.  Some 
human rights and environmental activists are calling for binding legal 
obligations to be placed on corporations.  At the same time, some corpo-
rations are devoting more resources to voluntary corporate social respon-
sibility initiatives. 
In corporate legal scholarship, the conversation over corporate so-
cial responsibility dates back to exchanges between Berle and Professor 
Merrick Dodd on the appropriate exercise of corporate power.64  The 
path for present day debates over corporate social responsibility was first 
forged in the pages of the Harvard Law Review with the publication of 
an exchange between Berle and Dodd considering which interests the 
corporation should serve and how to constrain corporate power. 
In his Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, Berle addressed the 
problem of managerial excesses and the risk of exercising power con-
trary to the interests of shareholders.  Then, Berle’s primary concern was 
providing a means to protect dispersed and disorganized masses of 
shareholders. In the article, Berle advanced a theory of managerial re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 62. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 356. 
 63. Id. at 355. 
 64. C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retro-
spective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 98 (2002). 
978 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
sponsibility in which management must exercise its power for “the rat-
able benefit of shareholders.”65 
The following year, Dodd’s For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees? rejected the shareholder primacy argument advanced by Berle. 
Dodd argued that the corporation should be conceptualized as a distinct 
legal persona in which corporate directors would be recognized not as 
trustees for the shareholders, but as trustees for the corporation in its own 
right.66 
Berle and Dodd differed over strategies for constraining corporate 
power.  Although Berle preferred a structure that protected shareholders 
against power excesses and Dodd presented a picture of an ethical mana-
gerial elite that could be trusted to act responsibly, both recognized the 
opportunities presented by the separation of ownership from control.  
Both Berle and Dodd appreciated the importance of shareholder protec-
tion, as well as the important interests that could be advanced by concen-
trated corporate wealth in the service of additional constituencies.67 
In later years, both men would evolve in their thinking and ap-
proach the question of corporate social responsibility in ways that de-
parted from their initial positions: 
Berle had realized that the implications of The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property were that running a corporation solely for the 
benefit of its shareholders was no longer enough.  The corporation 
wielded too much power, and shareholders had too tenuous a tie to 
their property, to justify such an overriding duty.  Dodd, meanwhile, 
had become disenchanted with the notion that corporations could on 
their own assume a new role.  Only government action, he con-
cluded could impose on corporate management the responsibilities 
he believed they owed.68 
C.A. Harwell Wells suggests that, from this vibrant start, legal de-
bates over corporate social responsibility would continue, but not neces-
sarily move forward.  Wells argued that, “each new round of debate on 
corporate social responsibility largely recapitulates the earlier debate[s] 
in a slightly altered form.”69  Put simply, the corporate social responsibil-
ity debate “rarely seems to go anywhere.”70 
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The corporate social responsibility debate, or some form of it, will 
be with us far into the future, unless and until the claims of the commu-
nity are so clearly articulated that they cannot be set aside.  To the com-
munity of corporate legal scholars, the observation that the corporate so-
cial responsibility dialogue is destined to return to recapitulating prior 
points is likely accurate.  However, the activities of members of the hu-
man rights and environmental advocacy community offer an interesting 
vantage point from which to view the potential for establishing corporate 
social responsibility that is not simply a trend, but something sustainable. 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle also envi-
sioned a time in which industry would encounter claims from social con-
stituencies beyond those within the shareholder class.  Berle explained: 
[D]emands are constantly put forward that the men controlling the 
great economic organisms be made to accept responsibility for the 
well being of those who are subject to the organization, whether 
workers, investors or consumers. . . .  In proportion as an economic 
organism grows in strength and its power is concentrated in a few 
hands, the possessor of power is more easily located and the de-
mand for responsible power becomes increasingly direct.71 
Berle indicated that, in the face of increasing demands from society, 
corporations might be made more responsible: 
Just as there is a continuous desire for power, so also there is a con-
tinuous desire to make that power the servant of the bulk of the in-
dividuals it affects.  Absolute power is useful. . . .  More slow, but 
equally sure is the development of social pressure demanding that 
the power shall be used for the benefit of all concerned.  This pres-
sure, constant in ecclesiastical and political history is already mak-
ing its appearance in many guises in the economic field.72 
Now, pressure is mounting.  Anti-globalization protesters view cor-
porate power as a significant problem.  Pressure groups protest share-
holder meetings and advocate for corporations to be held accountable for 
human rights abuses in which they are alleged to have been complicit.73 
The new concept of the corporation envisioned in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property can come into existence only when 
the “claims of the community [are] put forward with clarity and force.”74  
Indeed, it could come to pass that: “when a convincing system of com-
munity obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that mo-
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ment the passive property right of today must yield before the larger in-
terests of society.”75  Human rights and environmental activists are shap-
ing the content of the community’s claim for the exercise of corporate 
power to serve broader societal interests. 
II.  CORPORATE POWER AND COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES 
This Part describes the traditional scope of international law and 
explains how changes in global markets and geopolitics have led to calls 
to expand the scope of international law.  This Part also discusses the 
conceptual challenges for public international law presented by global-
ization and private actors—the multinational corporation in particular. In 
response to this challenge, recent public advocacy efforts and public in-
terest litigation have emerged to impose human rights obligations on 
multinational corporations, both in theory and in practice. 
Allegations are increasing that multinational corporations are di-
rectly engaging in human rights violations or are aiding and abetting the 
efforts of repressive governments to abuse human rights.  International 
human rights law has conventionally placed a primary emphasis on 
abuses perpetrated by governments and the relationship between states 
and individuals (protecting individual rights from state intrusion).  Con-
temporary human rights advocacy groups and others are now directing 
greater attention to questioning the role of private non–state actors—
principally multinational corporations—in conduct that contravenes gen-
erally accepted principles of international human rights law.  As Berle 
predicted, certain communities now claim that the interests of industry 
must yield to the larger interests of society. 
A.  The Scale and Scope of the Power of the Modern Multinational 
Corporation 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle equated 
the emerging power of enterprise to an empire; an economic empire that 
knows no geographic restrictions, and could possibly come to rival the 
state in its influence over social relations.  Indeed, industry today enjoys 
an expansive reach.  Unified corporate organizations operate across bor-
ders and are present in many different countries.  The organization of 
modern manufacturing has become more globalized, and a corporation 
may be present or hold interests in many different countries.  Some of the 
world’s largest corporations hold significantly more wealth than some of 
the countries in which they operate. 
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The scale and scope of some of the world’s largest companies bring 
salience to Berle’s early observations equating enterprise with empire.  
For example, in 2008, retail giant Wal-Mart’s revenue of $406 billion 
made it larger than the economies of all but the world’s twenty-five rich-
est countries, ranking ahead of Israel, Portugal, and New Zealand.76  Oil 
giant Exxon ranks not only ahead of Wal-Mart, but its revenues also ex-
ceed the gross domestic product of most of the countries in which it op-
erates, including Nigeria, Venezuela, Ecuador and Sudan.77  The com-
bined profits of the coalition of pharmaceutical companies which sued 
South Africa far exceeded the country’s gross domestic product.78 
An increased potential to advance or undermine respect for the pro-
tection of human rights and the environment accompanies the greater 
power of the modern multinational corporation.79  Accordingly, the ex-
pansion of corporate power around the world raises a question reminis-
cent of that posed by Berle in The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property: specifically, how to control the exercise of corporate power. 
Human rights activists and others are asking how to bring the con-
duct of corporations into alignment with human rights standards, and 
how to hold corporations accountable when their conduct deviates from 
respect for human rights.80 
Under international law, governments assume obligations to protect 
and respect human rights. It is therefore incumbent upon the state to en-
sure that all actors within the state’s territorial borders or under the 
state’s jurisdiction and control comply with laws enacted to protect hu-
man rights.  However, in light of the shifting power relationships be-
tween the state and the corporation that Berle so astutely predicted, the 
picture is more complicated with respect to a state’s responsibility to en-
sure that corporations respect human rights. 
Several factors complicate the conventional relationship between 
the state and the modern multinational corporation, including the fact 
that some poorer states are not as economically powerful as the multina-
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tional corporations they host.81  Compliance and enforcement procedures 
can be expensive and exceed the available resources of poor and devel-
oping states.82  Moreover, even where a poorer country would be able to 
enact and enforce compliance with human rights standards, the country 
may be unwilling to do so because the mobility of capital in the competi-
tive context of a global economic system would place the state at risk of 
losing investment from foreign corporations.83  Instead of protecting its 
citizens with stronger enforcement of environmental and human rights 
protections, the state may elect to promote foreign investment and reject 
increasing regulation to the extent that investors are perceived to favor 
environments with lower regulatory standards.84 
Globalization—the term applied to describe a social, economic and 
political phenomenon characterized by market-driven expansion and ac-
celeration of exchange across borders85—presents a challenge to the con-
ceptual foundations of international law, as premised on state action and 
responsibility.  Global governance has not kept pace with economic and 
social changes.86  This gap in global governance has fundamentally 
changed the dynamics of interactions between states and non-state actors. 
B.  The Conceptual Challenge of the Modern Multinational for State 
Sovereignty and the State of International Law 
Just as Berle highlighted the conceptual challenge that the corpora-
tion presented for the logic of property and profits at the time of his writ-
ing, today, the modern multinational corporation presents a comparable 
challenge to the logic of international law.87  Prior to World War II and 
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the creation of international multilateral institutions such as the United 
Nations in 1945, classic international law was literally the “law of na-
tions,” made by and for states to govern relationships between sover-
eigns.88  States were the sole “subjects” of international law and were 
imbued with “international legal personality.”89  With international legal 
personality, states enjoy full participation in the international legal sys-
tem by virtue of possessing the capability to exercise rights and observe 
duties under international law.  Under the classical view of international 
law, all other entities, such as private non-state actors, were merely “ob-
jects.”90 
Non-state actors were acted upon, not actors in the international 
system.  In contrast, states, as subjects of international law, enjoyed the 
right to engage in war, enter into treaties, form consensual rules of inter-
national behavior, claim for breaches of international legal obligations, 
and seek remedies. 
After World War II, an international system aimed at the protection 
and promotion of international human rights was created in an effort to 
ensure that the atrocities committed during the war should never be al-
lowed to recur.  The concept of international human rights gave the indi-
vidual rights against the state, divesting the state of its absolute, impene-
trable, and unchallenged sovereignty. 
Today, large and powerful private actors operating in and across 
many nations—specifically, multinational corporations—pose a signifi-
cant conceptual and practical challenge to international law.91  The clas-
sic state-centered view of international law is increasingly difficult to 
reconcile with the growing number of private, non-state actors who have 
a significant impact on both states and individuals internationally.  Tradi-
tional approaches to international law are no longer descriptively or con-
ceptually adequate. 
The process of economic globalization, fueled by private enterprise, 
is eroding the hegemonic place of the state as the subject and source of 
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ing the implications of recognizing corporations as persons and the concept of corporate person-
hood). 
 90. DAMROSCH, ET AL., supra note 88, at 299. 
 91. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
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international law.92  As a result of globalization, the place where power 
resides in the international system is growing more diffuse, and authority 
for traditionally public functions is being ceded to private enterprise. 
No longer are states thought to be the only entities implicated in 
human rights violations.  Significantly, corporations are increasingly im-
plicated along with governments in violating human rights.  The inde-
pendent obligation, if any, of multinational enterprise to conform to in-
ternational human rights standards is far from clear at this stage.93  Pres-
ently, multinational corporations operate largely unencumbered by the 
binding public international human rights obligations that states assume 
either through treaty or custom.  There are often regulatory gaps between 
the standards of the corporation’s home country and its host country; 
therefore, corporate action often occurs in a regulatory void where there 
is little law to guide business practices abroad. 
The global human rights protection and accountability gap high-
lights a significant theoretical problem in international law.  Specifically, 
public international law, as conventionally conceived, fails to adequately 
govern the conduct of private non-state actors, such as multinational cor-
porations.  In general, international human rights law is created by and 
binding upon states.  Yet, as a practical matter, some multinational cor-
porations control budgets larger than those of the states in which they 
operate, and have significant power as a result. 
The conceptual and regulatory problems that multinational corpora-
tions would eventually pose for international law was identified with ex-
traordinary clarity in 1970 by Detlev Vagts, who noted, “the present le-
gal framework [has] no comfortable, tidy receptacle for such an institu-
tion.”94  The problem is that a truly international corporation would be 
one organized by international law.  However, in reality, businesses that 
cross national borders generally take the form of “a cluster of corpora-
tions of diverse nationality joined together by common ties of ownership 
and responsive to a common management strategy.”95 
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Given this structure of multinational enterprise, corporations are 
able to operate across borders in an accountability deficit,96 largely out-
side the effective supervision or regulatory control of domestic and inter-
national law.97  Because the multinational corporation is mobile and able 
to allocate risk through manipulation of its identity, the multinational 
corporation is able to reconstitute itself between legally distinct, but eco-
nomically enmeshed, units. 
In the absence of international standards binding on private non–
state actors and in the presence of the global human rights protection and 
accountability gap, a number of efforts are underway to fill the void cre-
ated by lapses in international human rights coverage.98 
C.  Corporate Complicity in International Human Rights Violations 
Initially, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch focused their advocacy efforts primarily on the 
state.  However, in recent years, rights groups have expanded their field 
of vision to include private actors.  Rights activists working on social, 
economic, and cultural rights now highlight the role of private industry in 
impeding and advancing human rights and no longer limit their monitor-
ing to states and governments. 
For example, the mission statement of Human Rights Watch, in-
cluded in every investigative report the organization publishes, provides: 
“We challenge governments and those who hold power to end abusive 
practices and respect international human rights law.  We enlist the pub-
lic and the international community to support the cause of human rights 
for all.” 
Whether, and to what extent, private industry needs to respect in-
ternational human rights law is currently the subject of debate in the 
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academy, industry, and government.  While the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights proclaims that it applies to “all organs of society,” the 
exact nature of corporate responsibility for human rights remains unre-
solved.  However, corporate obligations with respect to human rights and 
the environment are evolving and emerging99 through a combination of 
efforts on the part of civil society to attach liability to corporate actors, 
and reactions on the part of corporations to address consumer concerns 
and respond to public criticism.100 
1.  Advocacy and Reporting 
While the activities of enterprise have profound effects on the qual-
ity of life in all countries and communities, academics and activists are 
only beginning to explore and understand the ways in which industry can 
influence human rights and impact the environment.  Organizations 
monitoring human rights are starting to investigate and focus attention on 
corporations.  Rights monitors are now reporting on a range of violations 
related to the conduct of corporate actors and the inability of individuals 
to obtain redress for harms they sustain as consequence of corporate 
conduct. 
As more research is conducted, an increasing base of literature is 
providing a greater understanding and appreciation of the nature and 
scope of the problems of corporate complicity in violations and the ex-
tent of the impact that certain business practices may have on human 
rights.  This research is also forming the basis for social protest move-
ments demanding that corporations exercise power in ways that respects 
human rights and the environment.101  Non-governmental human rights 
monitors have investigated the role of corporations with respect to a 
range of rights standards, including: the right to security of the person,102 
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economic and social rights,103 civil and political rights,104 equality,105 la-
bor rights,106 and the rights of indigenous people.107  The lack of corpo-
rate accountability for complicity in human rights violations and the in-
ability of individuals and communities to obtain effective remedy to re-
dress violations are also subjects being explored by various rights watch-
dog organizations and others. 
Human rights reports have found that the right to security of the 
person, including, specifically, the right to life, and to physical and psy-
chological integrity, have been negatively affected by corporations both 
directly and indirectly through connections to third parties engaged in 
violations.108  More recently, rights groups have reported direct viola-
tions by businesses, including findings that private, U.S.-based corporate 
contractors at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq allegedly tortured detainees 
under their control.109 
More frequently than direct involvement, corporations are indi-
rectly implicated in violations because of their relationships with third 
parties, such as corrupt or repressive government regimes.  Human rights 
activists maintain that when corporations “fail to ensure that their opera-
tions do not depend upon, benefit from, or contribute to human rights 
abuses committed by others,” corporations are complicit in violating hu-
man rights.110 
Human rights reports have documented several incidents infringing 
on the right to security of the person in connection with abuses perpe-
trated by security forces employed by corporations to protect property 
and prevent protests near corporate operations.  For example, corpora-
tions in Indonesia’s paper and wood pulp industry employed private se-
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curity forces that assaulted members of the communities in which the 
corporations operate.111  In southern Sudan, government forces used oil 
industry infrastructure to launch attacks against civilians, destroying en-
tire communities and displacing hundreds in the context of a civil con-
flict situation.112 
Sometimes corporate presence serves to fuel existing conflict in 
persistently war-torn but resource rich regions.  A 2005 report by Human 
Rights Watch documents how corporations in the extractive industry 
were implicated in human rights abuses through their connections to 
various warlords holding control over gold mines in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo.  In exchange for access to gold rich regions in zones of 
conflict, private corporations provided logistical and financial support to 
armed groups engaged in war crimes and crimes against humanity.113 
In the area of socioeconomic rights and environmental degradation, 
rights groups reported on the conduct of a Taiwanese corporation dump-
ing toxic waste in Cambodia.  The waste caused several deaths and de-
graded environmental conditions compromising the rights of local resi-
dents to health.114  Reports have also found that pollution from Nigeria’s 
oil industry severely impaired the livelihood of local communities by 
destroying the food supply and damaging the supply of fresh drinking 
water.115 
Multinational corporations can influence enjoyment of the right to 
food by influencing food security and the food supply.  For example, to 
meet the demands of commercial crops for foreign export, farmers in 
developing countries are replacing staple foods with non-traditional ex-
port products, thereby reducing food availability and placing food secu-
rity at risk for local residents.116  In another example, tobacco producers 
in developing countries are clearing trees in semi-arid environments to 
cultivate tobacco to supply an international export market.  The tree 
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clearing contributes to deforestation and soil erosion, and compromises 
food production in countries that are already at risk for food shortages.117  
Five multinational corporations control nearly seventy percent of the 
world’s tobacco production.118  Approximately four-fifths of tobacco is 
now produced in developing countries.119 
In the area of civil and political rights monitoring, organizations 
have documented instances of corporations engaging in rights abuses 
ranging from censorship and surveillance, to discrimination and slavery. 
In a 2006 report, Human Rights Watch documented how corporations 
were cooperating in China’s system of Internet censorship and surveil-
lance.  The report found that multinational corporations not only com-
plied with instructions from the Chinese government that were inconsis-
tent with international human rights standards, but also went further by 
attempting to anticipate what the Chinese government would want sup-
pressed and blocked an ever-broadening range of expression on the In-
ternet.  Companies complicit in censorship of political and religious 
views and in monitoring dissenting opinions aid the government in vio-
lating individual rights to privacy, blocking freedom of opinion and ex-
pression, as well as the right to impart and receive information.120 
Corporate social responsibility rhetoric of industry notwithstanding, 
international human rights groups maintain that it is “clear that existing 
efforts to address the impacts of business activities on human rights are 
insufficient.”  Accordingly, a coalition of rights groups have called for a 
U.N. Declaration or other international instrument to “define[] a common 
benchmark for business conduct.”121  This would offer “clearly articu-
lated and widely endorsed global standards . . . creat[ing] a framework 
for concerted action to ensure that business behavior around the world is 
human rights compliant.”122 
In the absence of an international agreement and adequate interna-
tional enforcement of human rights law, however, advocates have turned 
to other avenues. 
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2.  Adjudication and Litigation 
In addition to increased reporting to sway sentiment in the court of 
public opinion, human rights activists have asserted claims in the U.S. 
federal courts seeking to hold corporations accountable for violations of 
international human rights law.  To date, the primary tool for human 
rights litigation has been the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).123 Passed in 
1789, the ATCA authorizes civil lawsuits for monetary damages for inju-
ries sustained due to violations of international law.124  The ATCA grants 
federal jurisdiction over claims by individuals who are not citizens of the 
United States for torts that violate international law, including torts 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty.125 
Although the ATCA went virtually unused for nearly 200 years, re-
cently the statute has come to form the bedrock of human rights litigation 
in the United States for torts occurring abroad.126  Specifically, human 
rights activists have filed ATCA claims in an effort to reach the extrater-
ritorial conduct of corporations accused of violating human rights, either 
directly or indirectly, through collaboration with repressive regimes.127 
Cases brought under the ATCA were not, as expected by many in 
industry, dismissed out of hand.  Indeed, a number of federal courts en-
tertained the human rights claims of foreign plaintiffs in U.S. federal 
courts for violations of international human rights law.  A growing num-
ber of multinational corporations have been forced to defend against al-
legations of abuse filed in the U.S. and other courts. 
Most notably, ATCA cases have been brought against major multi-
national corporations for a range of human rights violations around the 
world. Royal Dutch-Shell Oil was sued for its alleged involvement in 
human rights violations associated with a Nigerian pipeline project.128  A 
more recent lawsuit accused Chevron of hiring, transporting, and super-
vising Nigerian security forces who shot protesters at a Chevron offshore 
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oil platform.129  Talisman was sued for alleged involvement in human 
rights abuses in Sudan.130  Unocal defended a lawsuit alleging that it en-
gaged in human rights violations in Burma.131  The conduct of Exxon-
Mobil in Indonesia led to a lawsuit alleging human rights abuses.132  
Texaco has been sued for its alleged involvement in human rights abuses 
in Ecuador.133 
But ATCA lawsuits are not limited to corporations engaged in ex-
tractive industries.  Coca-Cola faced allegations that it violated human 
rights in Columbia.134  Fresh Del Monte Produce was sued for allegedly 
engaging in abusing human rights in Guatemala.135  Pfizer was sued for 
allegedly violating international law prohibiting involuntary medical ex-
perimentation on humans in connection with drug trials on children in 
Nigeria.136 
Notwithstanding these initial claims, recent precedent has narrowed 
the range of violations available for ATCA claimants.  In Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the ATCA to apply only to 
crimes of universal jurisdiction; those crimes, such as genocide, that na-
tions have agreed are particularly heinous.137  Since Sosa, the ATCA is a 
somewhat weaker weapon for rights activists to use against corporations 
engaged in conduct that violates international human rights law.  Never-
theless, rights activists still frequently wield the ATCA in efforts to chal-
lenge and change corporate conduct. 
Lawyers continue to bring claims arising from the complaints and 
protests of communities in poorer countries.  The plaintiffs in most 
ATCA cases are poor, indigenous, and socially excluded people who are 
only able to bring claims because of the assistance of cross-border coali-
tions of lawyers.138  Perhaps ironically, the defendants in many of the 
ATCA lawsuits earn more in revenue annually than the gross domestic 
products of the countries in which the alleged rights abuses occurred. 
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The trajectory of ATCA litigation can be viewed as consistent with 
Berle’s prediction that communities would eventually come to place 
pressure on the corporate empire and impose obligations on the princes 
of industry.  Professor Ronen Shamir posits that ATCA litigation “repre-
sents a new approach on the part of plaintiffs toward [multinational cor-
porations], approximating their obligations and duties to that of national 
governments and adding new dimensions to current debates about sover-
eignty, globalization, the legitimate reach of extraterritorial law, and the 
possibility of global law.”139 
3. Adjusting Corporate Conduct and Responsibility 
While human rights and environmental activists have increased ad-
vocacy, reporting, and initiated lawsuits, significant segments of the cor-
porate sector have embraced voluntary codes of conduct to govern their 
business operations.  In his 1999 address to the World Economic Forum 
in Davos, Switzerland, former U.N. Secretary–General Kofi Annan pro-
posed a new United Nations initiative—the U.N. Global Compact—to 
address the social ills perceived to accompany globalization.  Inviting the 
world’s business leaders to join a new system of “shared values and prin-
ciples” that would put “a human face on the global market place,”140 the 
Secretary–General observed: 
Globalization is a fact of life. . . .  The spread of markets outpaces 
the ability of societies and their political systems to adjust to them, 
let alone guide the course they take.  History teaches us that an im-
balance between the economic, social and political realms can never 
be sustained for very long.141 
The Compact seeks to close the human rights protection gap by 
bridging the divide between global public interests and global private 
capital through the creation of a partnership between the U.N. (the public 
system) and multinational enterprise (the private system).  The Compact 
encourages responsible corporate citizenship by engaging business in 
ameliorating the harms associated with globalization to create “a more 
sustainable and inclusive global economy.” 142  The Compact enlists the 
private sector to work with the U.N., in partnership with international 
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labor and civil society organizations, to promote human rights, labor 
standards, and environmental sustainability within global corporate 
spheres of influence. 
Based in part on human rights principles already universally en-
dorsed by governments, the Compact aims to reflect the type of global 
society to which the international community has already agreed.  The 
Compact encompasses ten principles drawn from the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights,143 the International Labor Organization’s Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,144 the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development,145 and the U.N. Convention 
Against Corruption.146  The Ten Principles of the Global Compact in-
clude: 
Human Rights: 
Principle 1.  Businesses should support and respect the pro-
tection of international human rights within their sphere of 
influence; and 
Principle 2.  Make sure they are not complicit in human 
rights abuses. 
Labor: 
Principle 3.  Businesses should uphold the freedom of asso-
ciation and the effective recognition of the right to collec-
tive bargaining; 
Principle 4.  The elimination of all forms of forced and 
compulsory labor; 
Principle 5.  The effective abolition of child labor; and 
Principle 6.  The elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. 
Environment: 
Principle 7.  Businesses should support a precautionary ap-
proach to environmental challenges; 
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Principle 8.  Undertake initiatives to promote greater envi-
ronmental responsibility; and 
Principle 9.  Encourage the development and diffusion of 
environmentally friendly technologies. 
Anti–Corruption: 
Principle 10.  Businesses should work against corruption in 
all its forms, including extortion and bribery.147 
Specifically, companies participating in the Compact are asked to 
embrace, support, and enact—within their sphere of influence—these ten 
core values.148 
Of particular importance to articulating what communities can 
properly demand from corporations, the first two principles address hu-
man rights principles and provide: (1) businesses should support and re-
spect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
(2) businesses should make sure that they are not complicit in human 
rights abuses.149  Under the Compact, a participating corporation’s hu-
man rights commitment extends as far as its reasonable capability to in-
fluence events. 
The “support and respect” provision of Principle 1 provides that 
corporations should refrain from any act or omission that would violate 
human rights or encourage or assist others in the commission of such 
violations.150  U.N. commentary on the Compact recognizes that clarifi-
cation of corporate responsibilities will often depend on the particular 
context in which a corporation is operating, as well as upon the relation-
ship it maintains with others in that context.151  The “sphere of influence” 
concept that provides that corporations should assess the influence they 
possess and design their human rights protection measures accordingly 
captures this concern. 152  The scope of the commitment made by partici-
pating corporations is limited to the corporation’s own sphere of influ-
ence. 
While this “sphere of influence” concept is not clearly defined by 
international human rights law, commentary by the U.N. Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights asserts that a corporation’s sphere 
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of influence “will tend to include the individuals to whom the corpora-
tion has certain political, contractual, economic, or geographic proxim-
ity.”153  Therefore, a corporation may have substantial influence not only 
on its own employees, but also on suppliers and consumers.  Every cor-
poration has some sphere of influence: “the larger or more strategically 
significant the company the larger that company’s sphere of influence is 
likely to be.”154  The Compact’s commitment to respect and support hu-
man rights and avoid complicity extends to all those who are in a corpo-
ration’s sphere of influence, understanding, however, that “the extent of 
a company’s ability to act on its human rights commitment may vary 
depending on the human rights issues in question, the size of the com-
pany, and the proximity between the company and the (potential) victims 
and the (potential) perpetrators of human rights violations.”155 
The concept of “complicity” in Principle 2, according to commen-
tary from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, means 
that a company is participating in or facilitating human rights violations 
committed by others.  These “others” may be state governments, rebel or 
resistance groups, or another company or individuals.  Thus, “a company 
is complicit in human rights abuses if it authorizes, tolerates, or know-
ingly ignores human rights abuses committed by an entity associated 
with it or if the company knowingly provides practical assistance or en-
couragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of human 
rights abuse.”156  While the company need not engage in the abuse, its 
assistance or encouragement is such that, without the corporation’s par-
ticipation or facilitation, the abuses most probably would not have oc-
curred to the same extent, or in the same way.  Like the sphere of influ-
ence concept, the concept of complicity has not yet been fully elaborated 
under international law, but even where complicity may not be legally 
proved, public opinion may condemn a corporation seen to be complicit. 
In sum, Compact partners are urged to consider the nature of the 
human rights abuses committed in the country and how the company’s 
activities relate to those abuses. It is often possible to assess whether the 
pattern of human rights violations in a given country intersects with 
some aspect of the firm’s operations.  Companies participating in the 
Compact are encouraged to incorporate the Compact and its principles 
into their business strategy and operations. 
As a procedural matter, the Compact is a network of the Global 
Compact Office in New York and six other U.N. Agencies: the Office of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 153. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 17 n.10. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at n.11. 
 156. Id. at 19. 
996 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:4 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights; the U.N. Environment Pro-
gram; the International Labor Organization; the U.N. Development Pro-
gram; the U.N. Industrial Development Organization; and the U.N. Of-
fice on Drugs and Crime. 
To participate in the Compact, a company sends a letter from the 
CEO, endorsed by its board, to the U.N. Secretary–General expressing 
support for the Compact and its principles.  The corporate participant is 
then expected to publish an annual report on its progress to demonstrate 
implementation of the principles as a “communication on progress” tool 
to “demonstrate implementation through public accountability.”157  Be-
cause the Compact has elected a voluntary, rather than a legally binding, 
approach, it emphasizes a “best practices” approach.  Accordingly, the 
Global Compact Office encourages participating corporations to join re-
gional networks, dialogues, and learning partnership projects designed to 
support Compact implementation in a local context where the company 
and other Compact stakeholders can take an active role.  Businesses are 
invited to develop and share examples of corporate practices, experi-
ences, and lessons learned with membership and the public on the Com-
pact website. 
The U.N. maintains that the Compact is a wholly “voluntary corpo-
rate citizenship initiative.”158  Compact participants are assured: 
The Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument—it does not 
“police,” enforce or measure the behavior or actions of companies.  
Rather, the Global Compact relies on public accountability, trans-
parency and the enlightened self-interest of companies, labor and 
civil society to initiate and share substantive action in pursing the 
principles upon which the Global Compact is based.159 
Instead, the core of the Compact is presented as a “learning forum” 
for reaching a broader, consensus-based definition of what corporate 
conduct constitutes “good practices.”160 
The Compact relies to a great extent on the corporate community’s 
collective desire for cultivating a positive image to advance the Princi-
ples.  To that end, literature from the Compact Office makes abundantly 
clear that the Compact is in no way a binding or enforceable agreement. 
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While it is still early to assess the success of the Compact process, 
there are currently thousands of corporations participating in the Global 
Compact.  As of 2010 member companies included Cisco Systems, De-
loitte Touche Tohmatsu, DuPont, KPMG, Pfizer, Inc. BASF, Nike, Inc., 
Starbucks, Coca-Cola Company and Royal Dutch Shell among others.161  
The De Beers Group of Companies, Novartis, Volvo, Deutsche Bank, 
Bayer AG and Telefonica and others donated to the Foundation for the 
Global Compact launched in April 2006 to raise funds to support the 
work of Compact–related activities.162 
The Compact still remains in its infancy.  At the conclusion of the 
2004 Leaders Summit, the Secretary–General called for a strategic re-
view of the Compact and the development of a new governance frame-
work that will transform the initiative from its initial phase of experimen-
tation to one of greater focus, transparency, and sustained impact.  Con-
sultations have been convened to consider ways the Compact can give 
priority and attention to the synergies between the global and local levels 
of its activities, brand management, and quality assurance, as well as to 
promoting broader ownership of the initiative by all participants.  The 
Compact is taking on increased importance within the U.N. with the 
creation of an Inter-Agency Task Team composed of the six participating 
U.N. agencies.  The next phase includes plans for a board to provide stra-
tegic and policy advice.  The board will be composed of four constitu-
ency groups: business, civil society, labor, and the U.N. with differenti-
ated roles and responsibilities. 
Because it is not binding, certain members of the activist commu-
nity who regard industry to be engaged in a big “Bluewash” have criti-
cized the Compact.163  Some critics object that the U.N., by figuratively 
forming such a partnership, is acting at variance with the U.N.’s histori-
cal mandate.164  For example, the Transnational Resource Action Center 
(“TRAC”) strenuously opposed the Compact. TRAC maintains that an 
improper signal is sent when the U.N. Secretary–General proclaims a 
partnership to promote globalization with leading executives from corpo-
rations with bad reputations for terrible human rights violations in the 
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developing world.165  By acknowledging these corporations as members, 
these critics argue that the U.N. allows corporations to “Bluewash” their 
reputation and improve their image merely by virtue of becoming a 
Compact signatory. 
Moreover, there may be room to abuse the “the voluntary approach 
and vague principles” of the Compact.166  Accordingly, other critics from 
the human rights community object to the Compact’s failure to institute 
enforcement mechanisms.  The Compact Office concedes that: “the ques-
tion of what to do with companies who do not show ‘good faith’ in their 
dealings with the Global Compact . . . has not as yet been truly re-
solved.”167  Still other organizations have criticized the Compact’s failure 
to establish methods for monitoring compliance with the Principles.168  
Essentially, many of these critics would prefer real rules to the Com-
pact’s vague voluntarism. 
While many corporations have rushed to embrace the Blue, others 
are more hesitant and concerned about the possible consequences.  For 
example, the Secretary General of the International Chamber of Com-
merce issued a statement asserting that, while industry bears the respon-
sibility of being “good corporate citizens,” corporations do not have to 
meet the demands usually imposed on governments to ensure that laws 
are enforced.169 
In addition to the U.N. Global Compact program, Kofi Annan, in 
response to requests from the U.N. Human Rights Council to further 
consider the issues relating to the empire of enterprise, appointed a Spe-
cial Representative on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises.170  Since being named 
Special Representative in 2005, John Ruggie presented a series of reports 
to the U.N.  Ruggie proposed a conceptual and policy framework to 
structure conversations on business and human rights.  He announced 
three primary principles: (1) that states possess the duty to protect against 
human rights abuses by third parties, including industry; (2) that corpora-
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tions possess the responsibility to respect human rights; and (3) that ef-
fective remedy is warranted for those who rights are violated.171 
III.  REVISITING BERLE’S VISION: LESSONS FROM THE LEGACY OF THE 
MODERN CORPORATION 
Berle’s scholarship may not be an immediately obvious source for 
insights into international law, but after a review of the human rights is-
sues raised by corporate conduct abroad, it becomes more apparent that 
in certain respects analogies exist between the problems of the past and 
the present. 
Although Berle wrote to address the problems associated with eco-
nomic risks to individuals due to the unconstrained power of corporate 
control, his concerns can be extended into and apply to the sphere of the 
social and risks to communities as well.  Since Berle’s writings were 
among the first commentaries on corporate law to speak to the larger 
concern of the impact of the corporate system on society, the problems 
he identified with respect to corporate power would appear to apply in a 
global context as well. 
Dalia Tsuk’s discussion of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property summarizes the legacy of Berle’s work as one in need of rescue 
because, since its publication: “corporate law scholarship has been ob-
sessed with its exegesis of the potential economic risks associated with 
the separation between ownership and control in large business corpora-
tions.”172  Berle’s early writings were interpreted as advancing share-
holder supremacy.  This interpretation collapsed into a narrower notion 
of shareholder interest; an interest limited to short-term profit maximiza-
tion to the exclusion of the broader societal concerns which were also 
important in his book.173  As a result, Tsuk argues:  
The Legal Community has made corporate law, specifically the 
rules applicable to the allocation of power among directors, execu-
tives and shareholders ineffective as a means of regulating corporate 
power . . . over the course of the past century, corporate law has 
been used first to legitimate corporate power and then to exempt 
those exercising it from liability.174 
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This application is profoundly problematic in the context of corporations 
operating in developing states, in countries with repressive regimes, or in 
countries that are otherwise not accountable to the people living within 
its borders. 
As the reach of the corporation expands, it is appropriate to revisit 
Berle’s writings in the context of economic globalization and the rise of 
the modern international human rights regime.  It is especially important 
to remember that Berle’s main contribution was his normative message, 
principally, “that corporate power be exercised to benefit the community 
at large.”175 
Berle believed that the community could make claims of enterprise 
and, as the community came to more clearly craft and articulate its de-
mands, corporate power would have to concede in some measure and 
satisfy the demands of the public.  The problem of power and how to 
align business conduct in a way that is responsible to shareholders, or 
ultimately to respect human dignity and the environment, is a persistent 
one.  Today, we witness unprecedented advocacy, adjudication activities, 
and efforts to articulate the demands of people around the world. 
Accordingly, we still look to Berle so many years later and still 
have much to learn.  The Modern Corporation and Private Property was 
visionary for recognizing the potential perils of concentration of corpo-
rate power due to the separation of ownership from control, for predict-
ing the rise of an empire of economic enterprise comparable to the state 
in its power, and finally for imagining a new concept for the corporation 
and declaring an expanded scope of corporate interests. 
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle identified 
power disconnected from control.  This disconnect—combined with the 
irresponsible or amoral exercise of power—is an underlying condition 
that allows corporate complicity in human rights violations to occur.  The 
problem is particularly acute where states are weak, failed, in conflict, or 
corrupt.  Yet corporate law remains mostly concerned with internal gov-
ernance and focuses less on the external impacts these forms of corporate 
governance create, or the broader social environment in which the corpo-
ration conducts business.  As advocacy groups direct attention to the ef-
fects of corporate action, corporate legal scholars would do well to con-
sider what contributions corporate law can make to ameliorate, rather 
than exacerbate, human rights violations and environmental problems. 
Berle’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property provides 
scholars working on human rights—who have traditionally focused pri-
marily on government violations—with insights because its primary 
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teaching concerns the power of private actors.  Entities, which until very 
recently were beyond the discipline’s core concerns, are explored in 
great detail.  At the highest level of generality, the core study of interna-
tional law is also an inquiry into power.  The power of the sovereign now 
shares space with the power of the economic empire that Berle envi-
sioned.  The protection of human rights and the environment is entirely 
dependent on the responsible exercise of power wherever it resides. 
In light of the alleged corporate complicity in violations of interna-
tional human rights, it is an interesting exercise to ask what Berle would 
have advised. How might Berle’s concerns about the concentration of 
power and ways to control power have altered the outcomes or expanded 
choices of the pharmaceutical industry in South Africa, the extractive 
industry’s conduct in Nigeria, or the internet service providers in China, 
when met with claims from the community challenging their complicity 
in human rights violations? 
The early debate between Berle and Dodd is instructive because it 
considers which avenue for constraining corporate power would be best 
to avoid the abuses described above, and to align corporate conduct with 
respect for human rights. 
Berle looked to the shareholder community, in the form of the in-
vesting public, to represent the interests of the public, while Dodd main-
tained that management would best hold in trust the interests of the 
community.  Today a more pluralistic path is the proper approach to pro-
tecting community interests in a global economic system.  Therefore, the 
avenues offered by both Berle and Dodd must be taken.  Norms respect-
ing the interests of the community—when internalized by business lead-
ers as well as the investing public conversations—will move corporate 
social responsibility forward instead of in cyclical circles of academic 
and advocacy attention dependent on passing trends. 
The shareholder community can be a positive influence provided it 
is conscious, active, and informed.176 Management is also a potentially 
positive influence, but must be cognizant of the potential problems its 
business decisions may cause.177  Management must also communicate 
with other constituencies that its business decisions might affect and con-
sider these other interests.  There are forward-thinking corporate execu-
tives.  For example, the CEO of Seventh Generation named his company 
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after the decision making processes taken by Native American communi-
ties: decisions are made after taking into account the impact it may have 
on the community’s next seven generations, appreciating that all are 
connected. 
For Berle, it was the lack of connection that gave rise to the risk of 
abuses he feared.  As Berle’s biographer stated, “entrepreneurial compe-
tition had given way to depersonalized monopoly.”178  In a passage in 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle references Walter 
Rathenau’s writings on the depersonalization of the publicly traded cor-
poration, he despaired: 
[N]o one is a permanent owner. . . .  This condition of things signi-
fies that ownership has been depersonalized . . . .  The claims to 
ownership are subdivided in such a fashion, and are so mobile that 
the enterprise assumes an independent life, as if it belonged to no 
one. . . .  The depersonalization of ownership, the objectification of 
enterprise, the detachment of property from the possessor leads to a 
point where the enterprise becomes transformed. . . .179 
The law is left with powerful entities that possess legal personality but 
are lacking in identity or a sense of connection to community.  Yet, there 
are corporations for whom “identity,” as such, is central. 
At Google, “Don’t Be Evil” is something of a “cultural rallying 
call.”180  The founders of Google made an effort to retain their personal 
imprint on the corporation when it went public.  The founders retained 
37.6% of stock voting power and the executive management retained 
61.4%, thereby leaving investors “little ability to influence strategic deci-
sions through voter rights,” because the founders did not want to be at 
the mercy of the market and shareholder profit maximizing.  In their let-
ter to potential investors, Google warns that profits may be lower than 
those of corporations who are rewarded in the market for short term tac-
tics because they intend to maintain focus on the long term and resist 
pressure to meet quarterly market expectations.  So insulated, Google 
states that it will adhere to their one main principle: “Don’t Be Evil.”  
Initially, “Don’t Be Evil” applied to how Googlers should treat each 
other, but came to be associated with how Google should be in the world. 
The Owner’s Manual for Google Shareholders explains: 
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Google is not a conventional company.  We do not intend to be-
come one. . . .  Our goal is to develop services that significantly im-
prove the lives of as many people as possible.  In pursuing this goal, 
we may do things that we believe have a positive impact on the 
world, even if the near term finical returns are not obvious. . . . We 
will live up to our “don’t be evil” principle. . . . 181 
CONCLUSION 
Adolf Berle’s contribution to the field of corporate law can inform 
current debates over the alleged complicity of multinational corporations 
in international human rights violations.  Berle offered a perspective on 
the rise of an empire of business enterprise that envisioned allowing 
those within industry’s realm to demand that industry be accountability 
to society.  In international law there is little theory to account for how to 
treat an international non-state actor that may be as powerful as member 
states in the international community.  Berle’s insights teach that it may 
be appropriate to treat the multinational corporation as an entity that 
must—like a sovereign—bear some responsibility for societal well-
being.  Consciously conducting business across borders thus requires 
being cognizant of the concerns of the communities that the corpora-
tion’s conduct affects.  With respect to whether ownership or control is 
better suited to manage the social risks associated with business opera-
tions, it is becoming clear that both will be called upon to consider the 
demands of increasingly vocal communities. 
Corporate efforts not to be “evil” are indeed admirable, but corpo-
rate law has left society with an institution that has been systematically 
rendered amoral.  Perhaps we will see the workings of still another revo-
lution in the corporate system.  As industry imposes upon itself obliga-
tions that the law has not yet required through corporate social responsi-
bility initiatives in response to community pressures, we may see a revo-
lution of corporate conduct.  An interdisciplinary corporate legal scholar-
ship that comes to give greater consideration to how communities shape 
and shift normative expectations of power may adjust the present concept 
of the corporate form and better align corporate conduct with larger so-
cietal interests in the future. 
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